In The Bottom Billion, former World Bank economist Paul Collier argues that today there are countries in the world with a total population of almost one billion that have gotten caught in developmental traps. He calls these countries "the bottom billion" and Afghanistan is a member of this group. Collier lists four developmental traps-the conflict trap, bad governance in a small country, landlocked with bad neighbors, and the natural resource trap-out of which three very clearly apply to Afghanistan.
There is a strong correlation between a county's low-income status and it facing a higher risk of civil war. As Collier states, low-incomes, slow or no growth, existence of militants with an incentive to engage in violence, all constitute forces which can cause conflict to break out in a country. Furthermore, after a civil war has ended, the chances of relapse remain very high. Thus the forces listed above perpetuate the conflict, trapping the country in a cycle of violence. This is the "Conflict Trap," and since 1977 Afghanistan has been caught in it. In thirty years, Afghanistan has experienced three periods of civil war in which close to 1.6 million Afghanis have perished and thousands have become refugees. Afghanistan, a low-income country, always faced high risks of civil war which materialized. Once it came out war, however, the risk of civil war was even higher and it relapsed into war. Thus Afghanistan's low-income condition has condemned it to cycles of violence.
Collier calls the second trap "bad governance in a small country." Not only has Afghanistan suffered from bad government governance over the past thirty years, but also no government or a government with very limited control. As Collier explains, bad policies and governance can almost completely destroy a country's economy. Since the 1973 overthrow of King Zahir Shah, Afghani politics in the 1970s and 80s was marred by totalitarianism, factionalism, a policy of purges, and a failure to deliver administrative or economic reform. Each successive leader, from Mohammed Daud to Babrak Karmal, remained stuck in political infighting, unable to bring economic or political reform. The 1990s was much worse as Afghanistan went from the delegitimized government of Najibullah, to anarchy and then to the totalitarian and repressive control of the Taliban.
Third, Afghanistan is also landlocked and surrounded by "bad" neighbors. A landlocked country faces many hurdles toward successful development which can be overcome if its neighbors are economically strong. A landlocked country benefits from economic growth in its neighborhood; it can orient its economy to the economic demands of its neighbors and can use their strong transportation infrastructure for trade with other countries, e.g. Switzerland. Afghanistan has had no such luck. Most of Afghanistan's neighbors are classified by the World Bank as either being low-income or lower-middle income countries. Across many indicators of Human Development these states have "low human development." Furthermore, these countries are regularly ranked as some of the world's most undemocratic places and are host to the world's worst human rights violations. They also regularly find themselves in the bottom quartile of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Moreover, according to the World Bank's World Wide Governance Indicators, for most measures of good governance Afghanistan's neighbors fall in the bottom quintile of the world. Surrounded by Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Iran, Afghanistan is in a neighborhood with countries facing strong development and governance challenges.
Therefore, on October 8, 2001, the United States was invading a low-income country stuck in developmental traps. Has the U.S. invasion helped? Collier advocates military intervention and occupation of poor countries by rich ones. Like historian Niall Ferguson, he argues that only developed countries can bring these states out of their traps and put them on the path to development by restoring order, maintaining peace and creating systems of governance and economic development.
In Afghanistan there seems to be no signs of this. After eight years, the American imperial project lies in ruins and has condemned Afghanistan's future to further destruction. First, the U.S. invasion has caused a mass resistance movement, embroiling Afghanistan in the a third phase of its civil war. Second, this has caused increased lawlessness and also destabilized Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Today Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda use this region to plan operations and recruit and train militants to fight inside Afghanistan. This has also given rise to Pakistan's al Qaeda aligned Taliban, who have murdered hundreds of tribal leaders and destroyed the traditional system of governance, completely eroding the state's already minuscule control over these areas. Finally, this war has now launched Pakistan, another low-income country, into a civil war.
The American invasion has locked Afghanistan in the conflict trap. So, how should the West rethink Afghanistan?
First, there is a need to it should correctly recognize Afghanistan's fundamental problems. A major short-coming of the thinking of American policymakers is to confound symptom with disease. The 1990s Taliban, al Qaeda, and today's neo-Taliban are all symptoms of a larger disease-underdevelopment, low-income, high unemployment, and overall bad governance-and not a disease in themselves. Second, Afghanistan has been suffering for over three decades and one decade of engagement can scarcely undo years of past damage. Furthermore, disengagement of the international community will only bring further chaos. Third, the nature of engagement must be revised. How the international community engages Afghanistan over the next several years will heavily influence the outcome of the current civil war and Afghanistan's post-conflict situation. It is time to plan strategies for growth which take into account the country's current physical and economic endowments and the needs of its people.
There is a strong correlation between a county's low-income status and it facing a higher risk of civil war. As Collier states, low-incomes, slow or no growth, existence of militants with an incentive to engage in violence, all constitute forces which can cause conflict to break out in a country. Furthermore, after a civil war has ended, the chances of relapse remain very high. Thus the forces listed above perpetuate the conflict, trapping the country in a cycle of violence. This is the "Conflict Trap," and since 1977 Afghanistan has been caught in it. In thirty years, Afghanistan has experienced three periods of civil war in which close to 1.6 million Afghanis have perished and thousands have become refugees. Afghanistan, a low-income country, always faced high risks of civil war which materialized. Once it came out war, however, the risk of civil war was even higher and it relapsed into war. Thus Afghanistan's low-income condition has condemned it to cycles of violence.
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